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We discuss the origins of the Greek financial crisis as manifested in the growing fiscal 
and current-account deficits since euro-area entry  in 2001. We then provide an 
investigation of spreads on Greek relative to German long-term government debt. 
Using monthly data over the period 2000 to 2010, we estimate a cointegrating 
relationship between spreads and their long-term fundamental determinants, and 
compare the spreads predicted by this estimated relationship with actual spreads. 
We find periods of both undershooting and overshooting of spreads compared to 
what is predicted by the economic fundamentals. 
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1. Introduction 
The entry of Greece into the euro area in 2001 provided that country’s economy 
with a huge dividend in terms of sharply-reduced interest rates. The nominal interest 
rate on 10-year Greek government bonds declined from about 20 per cent in 1994, 
the time that the then-government announced a goal of bringing Greece into the 
euro area in 2001, to less than 3
1/2 per cent in early 2005. With the eruption of the 
Greek financial crisis in late 2009, however, interest rates have shot upward, with 
the 10-year government bond yield increasing to almost 12 per cent at the end of 
2010. To what extent have the wide swings in interest rates reflected economic 
fundamentals? This paper addresses that issue. 
We use the interest-rate spread between 10-year Greek and German government 
bonds to estimate a cointegrating relationship between those spreads and their long-
term fundamental determinants. Recent work on the determinants of spreads uses 
panel cointegration techniques on high frequency data where spreads are 
hypothesised to be driven by various financial market variables representing credit, 
liquidity and market risks (Dotz and Fischer, 2010; Fontana and Scheicher, 2010; 
Gerlach et al, 2010). By contrast, we focus on one country alone and the 
macroeconomic determinants of spreads. We argue that during the period 2001-
2009 the Greek economy was marked by growing, unsustainable fiscal and external 
imbalances. We posit that the sharp reduction in interest-rate spreads that occurred 
during  much of this period did not adequately reflect these imbalances. Our 
empirical results provide some evidence for this view. We also provide evidence that 
the sharp, upward reversal of spreads following the outbreak of the Greek financial 
crisis also did not fully reflect fundamental factors. Thus, both undershooting and 
overshooting of spreads have occurred. 
The remainder of this paper consists of five sections. Section 2 describes the origins 
of the Greek financial crisis, highlighting the crucial role of growing fiscal and external 
imbalances. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the recent literature on the 
determinants of spreads. Section 4 presents  the modelling approach used. 
Specifically, we use the methodology proposed by Johansen (1955a) and Pesaran and 
Shin (2002) to assess the cointegrating rank of a VAR system, and then proceed to 
identify the structural relationship determining Greek spreads. As we discuss in that   2 
section, during the period 2001-2009, Greek fiscal data were subjected to frequent 
revisions that had the effect of increasing the size of the fiscal deficits, surprising the 
markets. We construct a variable aimed at capturing these surprises and find that it 
plays a role in determining spreads. Section  5 presents the results. Section 6 
concludes. 
2. The Greek financial crisis: origins 
2a. The years of growing imbalances: 2001-2008/09 
On January 1, 2001, Greece became the twelfth member of the euro area.
1
Among the benefits conferred by the euro on its members are the following. (1) For 
countries with histories of high inflation, such  as Greece, it lowers inflation 
expectations and, therefore, interest rates. (2) It eliminates exchange-rate 
fluctuations and the possibility of competitive devaluations among participating 
countries, thereby reducing risk premia and nominal interest rates. (3) With low 
inflation, economic horizons lengthen, encouraging borrowing and lending at longer 
maturities. The lengthening of horizons and the reduction in interest rates stimulate 
private investment and risk-taking, fostering economic growth. The reductions in 
nominal interest rates under (1) and (2) lower the costs of servicing public-sector 
debt, facilitating fiscal adjustment and freeing resources for other uses.
 The 
motivation for joining the euro area reflected an assessment that the benefits of 
joining would outweigh the costs. In what follows, we discuss these benefits and 
costs. 
2
In the case of Greece, interest-rate spreads between 10-year Greek and German 
government bonds came down sharply in the years running up to, and the years 
following, entry into the euro area. These spreads are shown in Figure 1 for the 
period 1995 through 2010 using monthly data.
 
3
                                         
1 At its inception on January 1, 1999, the euro area consisted of eleven countries. Five countries have 
joined the euro area after Greece’s entry, bringing the total  number of members in 2011 to 
seventeen. For a detailed assessment of the euro area, see De Grauwe (2007). 
 As shown in the figure, spreads fell 
2 These advantages of a common currency exist so long as the central bank of the monetary union 
delivers price stability and is credible. In the case of the euro, the European Central Bank quickly 
established its anti-inflation credentials and became credible. 
3 In 1994, the then-Greek government set a goal to enter the euro area on January 1, 2001. The 
convergence of Greek economic indicators to those of other European Union countries contributed 
after 1994 to the narrowing of spreads prior to euro  area  entry.  For an analysis of the Greek 
economy before euro-area entry, see Garganas and Tavlas (2001).   3 
steadily, from over 1,100 basis points in early 1995, to about 100 basis points one 
year prior to euro area entry. Upon entry into the euro area in 2001, spreads had 
fallen to around 50 basis points and continued to narrow subsequently, declining to a 
range between 10 to 30 basis points from late 2002 until the end of 2007. During the 
latter period, the absolute levels of nominal interest rates on the 10-year instrument 
fluctuated in a range of 3.5 per cent to 4.5 per cent, compared with a range of 5.0 
per cent to 6.5 per cent in the year prior to euro-area entry. 
The low-interest-rate environment contributed to robust real growth rates. From 
2001 through 2008, real GDP rose by an average of 3.9 per cent per year – the 
second-highest growth rate (after Ireland) in the euro area  –  underpinned by 
household spending for consumption, housing investment, and business investment. 
Inflation, which averaged almost ten per cent in the decade prior to euro area entry, 
averaged only 3.4 per cent over the period 2001 through 2008. 
Although entry into the euro area contributed to a period of prolonged and robust 
growth, and low (by Greece’s historical standards) inflation, two deep-seated 
problems remained unaddressed; the country continued to run large fiscal 
imbalances and the country’s competitiveness – already a problem upon euro area 
entry – continued to deteriorate. 
Fiscal Policy. Figure 2 reports data on fiscal deficits and government expenditure and 
revenue as percentages GDP, beginning with 2001. As indicated in the figure, fiscal 
policy  was pro-cyclical throughout the period 2001 through 2009, with deficits 
consistently exceeding the Stability and Growth Pact’s limit of 3 per cent of GDP by 
wide margins.
4
                                         
4 The European Union’s Stability and Growth Pact aims to keep members’ fiscal deficits below 3 per 
cent of GDP and their debt-to-GDP ratios below 60 per cent of GDP. Entry into the euro area is, in 
part, contingent on the satisfaction of these fiscal criteria. In the case of the debt-to-GDP criterion, 
countries can be allowed to join if the debt ratio is seen to be approaching the 60 per cent critical 
value at a satisfactory pace. The latter circumstance applied to Greece. In the year 2000, Greece was 
allowed entry into the euro area with a debt-to-GDP ratio near 100 per cent of GDP (because the 
ratio was on a declining path) and a fiscal deficit initially reported at 3.0 per cent of GDP; the latter 
figure was subsequently revised to 3.7 per cent of GDP after Greece became a member of Europe’s 
monetary union. 
 Expansionary fiscal policy was mainly expenditure-driven, leading to a 
rise in the share of government spending (to over 50 per cent of GDP in 2009, from 
about 45 per cent in 2001). The government debt-to-GDP ratio remained near 100 
per cent throughout the period 2001 through 2009.   4 
Competitiveness. Although inflation in Greece during 2001 through 2009 was low by 
the country’s historical standards, inflation was relatively-high by euro-area 
standards. Inflation was, on average, more than one percentage point higher per year 
than in the rest of the euro area  (Figure 3). Wage increases, adjusted for 
productivity changes, also exceeded the average increases in the rest of the euro 
area. With both prices and wages growing at relatively high rates, competitiveness 
declined (Figure 4). In the period 2001 through 2009, competitiveness, as measured 
by consumer prices, declined by around twenty per cent; as measured by unit labour 
costs, competitiveness declined by about  25 per cent. With relatively high real 
growth rates and declining competitiveness, the current-account deficit, which had 
already topped 7 per cent of GDP in 2001, rose to about 14.5 per cent of GDP in 
both 2007 and 2008 (Figure 5). 
The large and growing fiscal imbalances were clearly not sustainable. Upon entry into 
the euro area, Greece gave up the ability to use two key tools to adjust its economy 
in the case of a country-specific shock. First, it lost the ability to set its own 
monetary policy. Second, it lost the ability to change the nominal exchange rate of its 
own currency. To compensate for the loss of these tools, the country needed to 
have the following: (i) relatively-low fiscal imbalances, so that fiscal policy could be 
used counter-cyclically in case of a country-specific shock, and (ii) flexible labour and 
product markets so that the country could be competitive without having to rely on 
changes in the exchange rate of a domestic currency to achieve and/or maintain 
competitiveness. As mentioned above, however, competitiveness declined 
substantially during 2001-2009, despite the already large current-account deficits at 
the  time of entry into the union. Moreover, instead of providing the role of an 
automatic stabilizer, the pro-cyclical stance of fiscal policy acted as a major source of 
shocks.
5 Nevertheless, the low levels of interest-rate spreads during 2001-08 suggest 
that financial markets paid little attention to the unsustainability of the fiscal and 
external imbalances during that period.
6
                                         
5 Given that inflation in Greece during 2001-2009 was higher than the average inflation rate in the rest 
of the euro area, the ECB’s single nominal interest rate meant that real interest rates in Greece were 
relatively low. Wickens (2010) argues that this situation warranted tighter fiscal policy. 
 
6 As mentioned in Section 3, however, real time fiscal data understated the severity of the fiscal 
situation. The real-time data typically indicated that the fiscal imbalances were declining. Subsequent 
revisions of the data showed that the imbalances were, in fact, increasing.   5 
2b. The wake up call 
The global financial crisis that erupted in August 2007, following the collapse of the 
US subprime mortgage market, initially had little impact on Greek financial markets; 
spreads on the 10-year instrument, which were in a range of 20 to 30 basis points 
during January through July of 2007, remained in the vicinity of 30 basis points for 
the remainder of 2007 and the first few months of 2008 (Figure 1). With the collapse 
(and sale) of Bear Stearns in March 2008, spreads widened to about 60 basis points, 
where they remained until the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September. The latter 
event brought spreads up to around 250 basis points during the first few months of 
2009, but they gradually came back down to about 120 basis points in August and 
September of 2009. 
Then came a double shock in the autumn of 2009. Two developments combined to 
disrupt the relative tranquility of Greek financial markets. First, in October the 
newly-elected Greek government announced that the 2009 fiscal deficit would be 
12.7 per cent of GDP, more than double the previous government’s projection of 
6.0 per cent.
7  In turn, the 12.7 per cent figure would undergo further upward 
revisions, bringing it up to 15.4 per cent of GDP
8
In light of the rapid worsening of the fiscal situation in Greece, financial markets and 
rating agencies turned their attention to the sustainability of Greece’s fiscal and 
external imbalances. The previously-held notion that membership of the euro area 
would provide an impenetrable barrier against risk was shaken. It became clear that, 
. Second, in November 2009 Dubai 
World, the conglomerate owned by the government of the Gulf emirate, asked 
creditors for a six-month debt moratorium. That news rattled financial markets 
around the world and led to a sharp increase in risk aversion. 
                                         
7 On its website, the Bank of Greece publishes monthly cash data on the central-government (as 
opposed to the general-government) fiscal accounts. These data are available with a two-week lag 
relative to the month for which they apply. The data pointed to a sharp, worsening trend in the 
central-government fiscal deficit during the course of 2009. In this connection, in early September 
2009 (ahead of the general election in October) Bank of Greece Governor, George Provopoulos, 
alerted the leaders of the two main political parties of the deteriorating fiscal situation and the need 
of strong corrective actions. See Ziras (2009). 
8  Part of the subsequent increase was due to a reclassification of  some public enterprises. The 
enterprises in question, which had previously been excluded from the general government accounts, 
were brought into those accounts.   6 
while such membership provides protection against exchange-rate risk, it cannot 
provide protection against credit risk. 
The two shocks set-off a sharp and prolonged rise in spreads, which, by-and-large, 
continued throughout the course of 2010. As shown in Figure 1, spreads on 10-year 
sovereigns widened from about 130 basis points in October 2009 to around 900 
basis points one year later. The widening took place despite an agreement in early 
May 2010 between the Greek government and the International Monetary Fund, the 
European Central Bank, and the European Commission, for a three-year,  €110 
billion adjustment loan under which the Greek government committed to lower its 
fiscal deficit to 8.1 per cent of GDP in 2010 and to below 3.0 per cent in 2014.
9
3. The determinants of spreads: an overview 
 Also, 
the widening occurred amid news that the European Central Bank had embarked on 
a programme to purchase those government bonds the spreads of which were seen 
as having risen for reasons unrelated to the fundamentals. To what extent did the 
rise in Greek spreads during 2010 relate to factors other than the fundamentals? We 
address this issue in what follows. 
Much of the earlier  work on the determinants of sovereign spreads relates to 
emerging market economies and covers external debt traded during the 1990s (Min, 
1998; Ferrucci, 2003; Grandes, 2007; Baldacci et al., 2008; Alexopoulou et al., 2010). 
The spread, in line with the idea that it reflects the risk premium required to induce 
agents to lend to the borrower, is typically modelled as a function of the probability 
of default and the loss given  default. These, in turn, are related to a set of 
fundamentals that can be grouped into four broad categories: liquidity/solvency risks, 
macroeconomic fundamentals, external shocks,  and market risks.  In general, the 
literature finds support for each of these potential determinants of spreads. 
In the literature, solvency risks are usually related (positively) to the overall level of 
debt (relative to GDP) or the government deficit-to-GDP ratio and the current-
account imbalance relative to GDP (which determines the stock of external – usually 
                                         
9  The loan also commits the government to undertake wide-ranging structural reforms aimed at 
making the economy more competitive. The 8.1 per cent deficit target for 2010 does not include the 
reclassification of public enterprises, mentioned above, which leads to an increase in the 2010 and 
2011 fiscal deficits.   7 
foreign currency –  debt). Liquidity risks relate to the ability of the sovereign to 
access the foreign currency required to service the debt accumulated; as such these 
risks are negatively related to export growth and the ratio of international reserves 
to GDP, and positively related to the debt service ratio (debt servicing/exports). 
Macroeconomic fundamentals examined in the literature include inflation, 
competitiveness (as measured by the real effective exchange rate), the terms of 
trade, and growth. Spreads are expected to be positively related to inflation, which 
provides an indication of macroeconomic stability. Competitiveness and the terms of 
trade affect the build-up of debt and the ability of the country to generate the 
foreign exchange required to repay. (They are expected to be negatively related to 
spreads.) Finally, countries that are growing at relatively-fast rates  usually find it 
easier to service a given level of debt. 
For emerging market economics, oil prices (or, more generally, commodity prices) 
and international interest rates tend to be the most important sources of external 
shocks. The latter are usually proxied by a US dollar-denominated interest rate since 
the predominance of emerging market external debt is denominated in dollars. 
Finally, the level of spreads is sometimes related to market conditions. In this 
connection, Ferruci (2003) tests whether spreads are positively related to market 
risk (the risk that secondary market prices might move against the bond holder) and 
liquidity risks (the risk that bond holders cannot liquidate their holdings without 
reducing secondary market prices). Ferucci proxies the former with the S&P 500 
equity index and the latter with the spread on debt between high and low-rated US 
companies.  Baek  et al.  (2005) construct a risk appetite index for developed and 
emerging markets based on the rank correlation coefficient between market returns 
and volatility. A positive correlation coefficient indicates risk-seeking behaviour 
whereas a negative one suggests risk-avoiding behaviour. Greater risk appetite is 
expected to be negatively related to the overall level of spreads.  An alternative 
measure of global risk aversion, used by Grandes (2007), is an index of US corporate 
bonds rated BB (junk bonds). 
An additional factor that is considered to influence spreads in emerging markets is 
political risk (Baldacci et al., 2008). The potential significance of this variable stems   8 
from the seminal work of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), who drew attention to the 
importance of willingness-to-pay, and not just ability-to-pay, as a determinant of the 
probability of default. Baldacci et al. (2008) measure political risk by taking the first 
principal component of the World Bank’s governance index and  the Heritage 
Foundation’s economic freedom index. An alternative measure (which also allows 
sub-indices to be calculated) used by Baldacci et al. (2008) incorporates information 
from the International Country Risk Guide database. Both measures are found to be 
significant and positive determinants of spreads (that is, an increase in political risk is 
associated with a rise in spreads). 
Finally, some authors investigate the extent to which contagion is a determinant of 
spreads  for emerging market  economies. Grandes  (2007), in his study of Latin 
American countries for the period 1993-01, includes dummies to cover potential 
contagion from the Mexican, Russian and Brazilian crises. All three dummies are 
found to be highly significant. In contrast, Min (1998) finds no evidence that the 
Mexican crisis shifted the level of spreads across developing countries upwards. 
As noted, the above literature focuses on emerging market  economies.  The 
literature on sovereign spreads in more developed countries (including euro-area 
countries), in addition to considering macroeconomic fundamentals, also focuses on 
common trends across countries and global financial conditions more generally. 
Consequently, panel datasets are typically used to allow cross-country similarities 
and differences to be exploited in identifying the common international factor
10
In the light of the ongoing sovereign debt crisis affecting  euro-area countries, a 
number of papers have focused  on the determinants of spreads in euro-area 
countries. Dotz and Fischer (2010) seek to explain spreads by decomposing spreads 
to generate country-specific default probabilities. A GARCH-in-mean approach 
allows the authors to extract perceived default probabilities whilst controlling for 
macroeconomic determinants of spreads along with a measure of financial stability 
(the movement in the equity index of country x relative to an overall equity index 
for the euro area) and distress (corporate bond spreads). The sample of daily data 
runs from February 2002 to end-April 2009. They find strong evidence of a break in 
. 
                                         
10 See, for example, Favero et al., 1997; Codogno et al. 2003; Geyer et al., 2004; Gerlach et al., 2010.   9 
March 2008 with the rescue of Bear Stearns. Pre-rescue, the measure of financial 
distress – corporate bond spreads – is negatively related to sovereign spreads as 
corporate and sovereign bonds are perceived as substitutes; post-rescue, the 
coefficient turns positive. At the same time, during the pre-rescue  period  a real 
appreciation has a negative impact on spreads as real appreciation is interpreted as 
evidence of growth and real convergence; post-rescue,  the impact  is strongly 
positive. 
Fontana and Scheicher (2010) use weekly data on CDS spreads and benchmark bond 
spreads from January 2006  -  June 2010. Their main aim  is to examine arbitrage 
between CDS spreads and bond spreads. However, the authors also examine the 
determinants of spreads, using various financial market measures as explanatory 
variables. These measures include the implied volatility of the S&P500 equity index, 
corporate CDS premia (as a measure of credit market risk), idiosyncratic equity 
volatility  (capturing country-specific factors) and outstanding bonds/GDP. They 
conclude that credit market factors (corporate bond spreads) are important in 
explaining sovereign spreads; indeed,  they are found to be more important than 
either the equity market variables or debt. From September 2008, the authors find 
that country-specific factors are also  priced into bonds markets.  Gerlach  et al. 
(2010), using euro area country spreads between 2000 and 2009, find strong support 
for the hypothesis that spreads are driven many by international risk considerations. 
However, beyond international risk, countries with large banking sectors are found 
to be more sensitive to changes in aggregate risk. Thus, spreads in such conditions 
widened more than would be expected following the increase in risk associated with 
the global financial crisis. The authors also find evidence that spreads vary with 
country-specific factors, such as government debt and fiscal balances. Georgoutsos 
and Migiakis (2010) examine the extent to which monetary unification has led to 
complete financial integration between euro area bond markets by focusing on the 
determinants of bond spreads, including corporate bond spreads, the slope of the 
yield curve (containing information on inflation and growth), inflation differentials, 
equity returns and the difference between the interbank rate and the central bank 
refinancing rate. The authors use a Markov switching methodology, which allows for 
endogenous switching between regimes of low and high volatility. The results suggest   10 
that the determinants of spreads vary across regimes and countries, suggesting that 
financial integration is still incomplete. 
 
4. Data and methodology 
In contrast to much of the existing literature, which largely focuses on panels, the 
purpose of this paper is to focus on the determinants of spreads in one particular 
country, Greece, using time series cointegration techniques. The data sample is 
monthly and runs from January 2000 to September 2010. Our aim is to identify the 
fundamental macroeconomic determinants of government bond spreads. In 
particular, we seek to identify the fundamental long-run determinants of spreads for 
the 10-year benchmark Greek bond relative to the German 10-year bond. We then 
use these determinants to assess  whether  there is any evidence of market 
overshooting or undershooting. Thus, we purposely avoid using financial market data 
to explain movements in spreads. Measures of risk or risk appetite based on financial 
market data may help in tracking actual spreads, since financial market conditions 
across countries tend to be highly correlated, but  they  do not explain  the 
fundamental determinants of spreads at the national level. Thus, our aim is to identify 
the extent to which the evolution of Greek spreads reflects Greece’s  economic 
fundamentals. 
We focus on the macroeconomic variables that  were found to be significant 
determinants of spreads in much of the literature and which emerge from the 
narrative part of this paper. The variables used are as follows. 
First, we include a measure of the fiscal situation. Potential explanatory variables are 
the ratio of government debt-to-GDP and the deficit-to-GDP ratio. Since Greece’s 
entry to the euro area in 2001, Greek fiscal data have been subjected to a number of 
revisions, sometimes several years after the initial (real-time) release of the data. 
These revisions have often involved upward revisions of the fiscal imbalances, 
generating negative surprises. In order to capture the news (or surprise) element 
that has figured strongly in the Greek experience, we also construct some real time 
fiscal data. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time such a variable has 
been constructed and its impact on spreads investigated. In particular, using the   11 
European Commission Spring and Autumn forecasts
11
Second, we seek to capture the decline in competitiveness experienced by the 
Greek economy since entering monetary union. With the exchange rate fixed, the 
Greek price level relative to that of Germany provides a measure of real 
appreciation. We also examine the impact of measures of the trade and current 
accounts (as percentages of GDP). 
, we create a series of forecast 
revisions.  For example,  the revision in the Spring 1996 forecasts is the 1996 
deficit/GDP ratio in the Spring compared to the forecast for 1996 made in the 
Autumn of 1995. This procedure allows us to generate a series of revisions (see 
Figure  6),  which,  when cumulated over time, provides  a  cumulative  fiscal news 
variable (see Figure 7). Clearly, the variable underestimates the extent of fiscal news 
which actually emerged during the period. For example, when the newly elected 
government revised the fiscal data in Autumn 2004, upward revisions of the deficit 
occurred not only for 2004 (captured in our variable), but also for the years 2000-
2003. Another example is given by the revisions to the deficit in 2009. In the Autumn 
2009 forecasts, the deficit for 2009 was revised upwards to 12.7 per cent of GDP 
from the 5.7  per cent  forecast in the Spring. This revision, however, does not 
account for subsequent revisions to the 2009 deficit which occurred in 2010 and 
brought the figure to 15.4 per cent. To help account for these subsequent revisions, 
we also include a series of the latest estimate of the fiscal deficit (as a percentage) of 
GDP in our empirical work. 
Third, economic activity has been found to be an important determinant of the 
ability of a country to meet its obligations. Given the GDP data are available only on 
a quarterly basis, we use the rate of change of a monthly coincident indicator of 
economic activity constructed  by the Bank of Greece to provide a measure of 
growth (Hall and Zonzilos, 2003). 
Finally, we assess the effects of several external factors, in particular, the price of oil. 
The Greek economy is the  most oil-dependent  economy  in the euro area,  and 
macroeconomic aggregates are sensitive to changes in the price of oil. Unlike much 
of the literature, we do not test for the significance of foreign interest rates given 
                                         
11 The European Commission publishes forecasts only twice a year.   12 
that almost 99 per cent of Greek government debt is denominated in its domestic 
currency, the euro. 
We initially estimate a co-integrated VAR treating all variables, except for oil prices, 
as endogenous. This procedure generates a long-run relationship between spreads 
and the variables discussed above. Along the lines of Ferucci (2003), we use the long-
run relationship to generate a series of spreads predicted by the macroeconomic 
fundamentals. A comparison of predicted with actual spreads allows us to comment 
on the degree to which the actual spread appears to overshoot and/or undershoot 
both in the pre-crisis and crisis periods. 
The primary objective here is to identify the structural relationship which 
determines the long-run behaviour of the Greek spread. We therefore need to 
consider the issue of the formal identification of a cointegrated VAR. The 
identification problem for non stationary models can be stated using the structural 
and reduced form vector equilibrium correction model VEqCM
12
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Here z is a vector of N variables (as described above), A and Γ are matrices of 
suitably dimensioned parameters where  j j A A
1
0
− = Γ , δ  is a vector of deterministic 
components, 
s s β α ,   are the structural loading weights and cointegrating vectors 
respectively and have the dimensions  r N ×  to reflect the reduced rank nature of the 
system. The term  t ε is a vector of white noise error terms. Using (1) and (2) we 
can state the identification problem as simply one of being able to uniquely 
determine the parameters in the structural model (1) from the estimated reduced 
form  model (2). In this sense the problem is formally identical to the Cowles-
Commission identification problem. However,  the identification problem for the 
                                         
12 See Davidson and Hall (1991), Canova (1995) and Pesaran and Smith (1998).    13 
model (1) and (2) is different in a fundamental way to the Cowles-Commission (or 
standard) identification problem. This is because it now consists of two distinct 
parts. The first part is the problem of uniquely determining  0 A  in (1). Since z ' β  are a 
set of stationary variables (as they are the cointegrating combinations of the non-
stationary variables), in this sense every term in equation (2) is stationary and this 
leads to the standard identification problem, which is that of uniquely determining 
A0. This problem gives rise to the standard rank and order conditions. However, 
even if this first identification problem is dealt with, this still leaves a second part of 
the problem unresolved. This second problem arises because even if A0 is known, we 
cannot uniquely determine the structural cointegrating vectors from the reduced 
form estimates. 
The problem of identifying the structural cointegrating vectors is well known. Thus it 
is easily seen that α   and  β   are not identified in general since 
β α β α β α ′ = = ′
− +′ + 1 PP  for any non-singular (r x r) matrix P (rotation). Hence in 
the reduced rank case the long-run part of the model is not identified. This is true 
even if A0 is known, and it is this that leads to the second part of the identification 
problem. To resolve it, it is necessary to determiner, and identify β   with a 
completely separate procedure. To determine the cointegrating rank r we can use 
standard tests. The next step is more difficult. To achieve full identification of the 
entire model, both the contemporaneous coefficients A0   and  the long-run 
coefficientsβ  need to be identified. These are logically separate issues, as there are 
no mathematical links between restrictions on A0 and those onβ . It follows that 
restrictions are required to identify β   even if  A0  were known. Conversely, 
restrictions on β  have no mathematical implication for the restrictions onA0.
13
The derivation of formal identification criteria of the long-run in a VEqCM is the 
main subject of Johansen and Juselius (1990) and Pesaran and Shin (2002), where it is 
demonstrated that a necessary order condition for exact identification is that there 
 
                                         
13 It remains possible though that the economic interpretation of a restricted set of cointegrating 
vectors  ′ β zt may have implications for the nature of restrictions on A0  that will be economically 
interesting, particularly when A* is restricted via α . Mathematical, and possibly economic, linkages 
then do exist between restrictions on the adjustment coefficients α  and those required to identify 
β  - see Doornik and Hendry (1997).   14 
are  k r =
2 restrictions on the  β  vectors. Johansen (1995a) and Pesaran and Shin 
(2002) also give a necessary and sufficient rank condition for exact identification, 
which, for example, rules out dependence amongst the r
2 restrictions. In general, if 
the number of available restrictions k r <
2 theβ  system is under-identified, if k r =
2 
theβ  system is exactly identified, and when k r >
2 theβ   system is over-identified 
and, subject to the rank condition being satisfied, the over-identifying restrictions are 
testable. 
The methodology employed in what follows is to begin by assessing the cointegrating 
rank of our VAR system and to then proceed to identify the structural relationship 
that determines the Greek spread. We will then present the impulse responses of 
the VEqCM for completeness,  but our main focus will be on the long-run 
cointegrating vector which determines the spread, as this will allow us to identify the 
departures from the equilibrium spread. 
5. Results 
We begin by estimating a standard VAR of order 3 based on the Schwartz/Akaike 
information criterion,  with the objective to minimise  the VAR length subject to 
passing a selection of LM tests for serial correlation. The results of the chosen VAR 
are presented in Table 1. As usual, the VAR coefficients have very little economic 
interest as the individual coefficients are not interpretable. All that is important at 
this stage is that the VAR residuals are generally well-behaved; in this case, the VAR 
residuals pass a range of LM tests for serial correlation and seem well behaved. Table 
2 presents the results for the standard Trace and Maximum Eigenvalue tests for 
cointegration. Both tests reject the hypothesis of no cointegration, implying there is 
at least one cointegrating vector. The hypothesis that there is only one vector 
cannot be rejected at conventional levels of statistical significance. This implies that 
we have one cointegrating vector. In line with the existing literature, the results 
provide support for the significance of relative prices, economic activity and  oil 
prices.  In addition, our measure of fiscal news is also important in explaining 
movements in Greek spreads. Other variables – the final (latest) estimates of the 
fiscal-deficit-to-GDP ratio,  the debt-to-GDP ratio, and  measures of the trade or 
current accounts of the balance of payments – were found to be insignificant because   15 
their effects were captured by other (significant) variables.  Thus,  movements in 
relative prices best capture the effect of changes in external competitiveness  on 
spreads,  whereas  real-time  news about the fiscal aggregates, as measured by 
revisions to the Commission’s forecasts, best captures the government’s fiscal 
situation. 
We then construct a cointegrated VAR, imposing the restriction of one cointegrating 
vector and given that r=1 we need only one restriction to identify the relationship as 
a structural one determining the spread (this is to normalise the coefficient on the 
spread to be -1). The loading weight  (the  α
s)  from the equation for the Greek 
spread is correctly signed and the cointegrated VAR is stable. In Figure 8, we present 
the impulse responses of the Greek spread using the standard Cholesky 
decomposition for the shocks
14
In order to assess deviations of spreads from their long-run equilibrium values, we 
proceed to estimate a simple OLS model of the cointegrating vector. Moving to a 
simple OLS estimation is consistent with the existence of only one cointegrating 
vector in the model. The results are presented in Table 3. As is clear from that table, 
explanatory variables enter the long-run equilibrium regression with the correct sign. 
The results suggest that an increase in economic activity or cumulative good fiscal 
news reduce the spread; by contrast, a rise in Greek prices relative to German or a 
rise in oil prices cause the spread to increase. 
  to the other endogenous variables.  With the 
exception of the response of the spread to cumulative fiscal news, the other impulse 
responses are as expected. Initially, the spread reacts incorrectly to an innovation to 
fiscal news – that is, good news initially causes the spread to rise, but after some 
months it falls to negative values, as expected. 
The relative economic importance of the variables can be derived by calculating the 
impact on spreads of a one standard deviation increase in each of the explanatory 
variables (based on the rationale that a one standard deviation change is actually 
observed in the data itself). The largest effect comes from relative prices: a one 
standard deviation increase in Greek prices relative to German prices causes spreads 
to rise by 225 basis points. This result highlights the importance of the deterioration 
                                         
14  Note that since oil prices are assumed to be exogenous, they do not appear in the impulse 
response functions.   16 
in competitiveness for the terms on which the government can borrow. By contrast, 
economic activity has an important beneficial effect. A one standard deviation 
increase in economic activity causes spreads to fall by 138 basis points. The impact of 
cumulative fiscal news is smaller,  but nonetheless significant –  a one standard 
deviation increase in our  cumulative fiscal news variable  (defined  as good news) 
causes spreads to fall by 54 basis points. It should be recalled, however, that although 
our fiscal variable aims to capture the effect of fiscal surprises, by construction, it 
likely understates the magnitude of those surprises. Finally, the effect of oil prices is, 
not surprisingly, relatively small, with a one standard deviation increase in the price 
of oil causing spreads to rise by only 17 basis points. 
Figure  9  graphs the actual spread along with that predicted by the long-run 
equilibrium equation in Table 3, allowing us to identify periods of undershooting and 
overshooting of actual spreads. We define undershooting and overshooting as cases 
where the difference between actual and predicted spreads lie outside the standard 
error bands around the residuals plotted in Figure 9.  
The first period in which the actual spread deviates significantly from the predicted 
spread runs from the end of 2004 until the beginning of 2005.  This  period 
corresponds to the time (in late 2004) that a newly-elected Greek government 
revised the fiscal deficits, leading to real larger deficits for the period 2000-2004. It 
appears, however, that spreads did not respond to these revisions – spreads were 
significantly lower than predicted. During that period, spreads were in a range of 10 
to 25 basis points; on average,  they were some 120  basis points  below what is 
predicted by our model.  
The second period during which  actual spreads significantly deviated from those 
predicted by the model occurs at the end  of our data sample. From mid-2009, 
predicted spreads  rose sharply, mainly in response to the succession of fiscal 
surprises; from late 2009 through the first quarter of 2010, predicted spreads 
exceeded actual spreads by significant amounts (usually by over 100 basis points). 
Subsequently, actual spreads rose sharply and, beginning in May 2010, actual spreads 
exceeded predicted spreads; the difference became significant in June and remained 
significant through the end of our sample period (in September 2010). For example, 
whereas predicted spreads were just over 500 basis points in September 2010, the   17 
actual spread, at around 900 basis points, was about 400 basis points higher. Thus, 
our results suggest that there have been episodes of both significant undershooting 
and significant overshooting during the period since Greece joined the euro area. 
6. Conclusions 
Entry into the euro area provided Greece with the opportunity to benefit from the 
credibility of the monetary policy of the European Central Bank and the resulting 
environment of relatively-low inflation rates and low nominal interest rates. In turn, 
the low interest rates reduced the cost of servicing the public-sector debt, facilitating 
fiscal adjustment and freeing resources for other uses. Instead of taking advantage of 
this environment to adjust the economy, during the period 2001-2009 successive 
Greek governments ran fiscal deficits that averaged over 6 per cent of GDP and they 
increased the share of government spending in the economy. 
To some extent, the markets may have helped lull the Greek governments into 
believing that the low interest-rate environment would be a permanent feature of 
the Greek economy. Our findings strongly support the view that the low-levels of 
interest-rate spreads reached in the mid-2000s were not justified by the economic 
fundamentals. In turn, after the crisis erupted in 2009, interest-rate spreads appear 
to have strongly overshot in an upward direction. The markets’ verdict of Greece’s 
fiscal and external imbalances may have come late in the day, but when it came, it 
came with a vengeance. 
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Appendix: Data sources 
Spread: 10-year benchmark German government bond minus 10-year benchmark 
Greek government bond - ECB Statistical Data Warehouse – monthly average. 
 
Fiscal data: from Commission forecasts published in European Economy  and 
Government Fiscal Statistics published by Eurostat. The forecasts are semi-annual; 
the actual data, quarterly. All series are interpolated. 
 
Trade and current account data: taken both from Bank of Greece and EL.STAT. 
Quarterly series were interpolated. 
 
Relative prices: log difference of the monthly seasonally-adjusted harmonised index 
of consumer prices (HICP) between Greece and Germany –  Thomson-Reuters 
DataStream. 
 
Economic activity:  rate of change of coincident indicator of economic activity 
constructed by Bank of Greece (Hall and Zonzilos 2003). 
 
Oil prices: US dollars per barrel of Brent crude oil (FOB) –  Thomson-Reuters 
DataStream. 
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Figure 1: Greek Spreads: Yields on Greek over German 10-year Benchmark Bonds 




















Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse 
 
 
Figure 2: The fiscal deficit, total expenditure and total revenue
(% of GDP )
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Source: European Commission, Excessive Debt Procedure Notification   22 
Figure 3: Greece and Euro Area Inflation 2001-2010
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Source: EL.STAT 
 
Figure 4: Real Effective Exchange Rate Index (2001Q1=100)
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Figure 6: Greek General Government Balance: revisions to Commission Spring and 
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Source: own calculations (see text)   25 
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Table 1: VAR output 
 
         
         
  Fiscal news  Relative prices 
Economic 
Activity  Spread 
         
          Fiscal news (-1)   2.131542   0.000155   0.011867   3.396499 
   (0.11306)   (0.00054)   (0.01137)   (2.19872) 
  [ 18.8535]  [ 0.28634]  [ 1.04347]  [ 1.54476] 
         
Fiscal news (-2)  -1.599330  -0.000765  -0.003501  -10.07221 
   (0.21850)   (0.00105)   (0.02198)   (4.24929) 
  [-7.31965]  [-0.72965]  [-0.15927]  [-2.37033] 
         
Fiscal news (-3)   0.438646   0.000584  -0.009580   6.269450 
   (0.11905)   (0.00057)   (0.01198)   (2.31534) 
  [ 3.68441]  [ 1.02319]  [-0.79994]  [ 2.70779] 
         
Relative prices (-1)  -1.181327   0.472012   1.223908   489.9511 
   (19.4452)   (0.09329)   (1.95600)   (378.165) 
  [-0.06075]  [ 5.05949]  [ 0.62572]  [ 1.29560] 
         
Relative prices (-2)   24.34149   0.318379  -1.308089   127.3640 
   (21.2828)   (0.10211)   (2.14085)   (413.902) 
  [ 1.14371]  [ 3.11804]  [-0.61101]  [ 0.30772] 
         
Relative prices (-3)  -18.58019   0.070298   3.276060  -285.0586 
   (19.8023)   (0.09501)   (1.99192)   (385.109) 
  [-0.93828]  [ 0.73993]  [ 1.64468]  [-0.74020] 
         
Economic Activity (-1)   1.429588  -0.000963   1.769862   0.771444 
   (0.94130)   (0.00452)   (0.09469)   (18.3061) 
  [ 1.51874]  [-0.21334]  [ 18.6920]  [ 0.04214] 
         
Economic Activity (-2)  -3.049898   0.005808  -0.749079  -6.573628 
   (1.79107)   (0.00859)   (0.18016)   (34.8321) 
  [-1.70284]  [ 0.67588]  [-4.15776]  [-0.18872] 
         
Economic Activity (-3)   1.858720  -0.004653  -0.056057   5.347972 
   (0.94733)   (0.00454)   (0.09529)   (18.4233) 
  [ 1.96207]  [-1.02370]  [-0.58826]  [ 0.29028] 
         
Spread (-1)  -0.029655   9.15E-06  -0.000252   1.092140 
   (0.00604)   (2.9E-05)   (0.00061)   (0.11739) 
  [-4.91263]  [ 0.31585]  [-0.41495]  [ 9.30318] 
         
Spread (-2)   0.052703   2.90E-05  -0.000824   0.281340 
   (0.01049)   (5.0E-05)   (0.00105)   (0.20396) 
  [ 5.02527]  [ 0.57714]  [-0.78146]  [ 1.37939] 
         
Spread (-3)  -0.019748  -3.85E-05   0.000720  -0.345149 
   (0.00644)   (3.1E-05)   (0.00065)   (0.12531) 
  [-3.06473]  [-1.24422]  [ 1.11021]  [-2.75430] 
         
Constant   0.855250  -0.022153   0.853438   78.40085 
   (2.90124)   (0.01392)   (0.29184)   (56.4225) 
  [ 0.29479]  [-1.59152]  [ 2.92437]  [ 1.38953] 
         
Oil Price (-4)   0.018570  -1.78E-05  -0.001210   0.341134 
   (0.00587)   (2.8E-05)   (0.00059)   (0.11406) 
  [ 3.16625]  [-0.63414]  [-2.05128]  [ 2.99077] 
           28 
TIME  -0.024947   0.000183  -0.005073  -0.768225 
   (0.02139)   (0.00010)   (0.00215)   (0.41599) 
  [-1.16626]  [ 1.78506]  [-2.35794]  [-1.84673] 
         
           R-squared   0.998845   0.994490   0.999206   0.990592 
 Adj. R-squared   0.998703   0.993813   0.999109   0.989437 
 Sum sq. Resids   76.53309   0.001762   0.774392   28945.80 
 S.E. equation   0.819355   0.003931   0.082419   15.93457 
 F-statistic   7039.891   1469.682   10251.13   857.3905 
 Log likelihood  -149.3683   539.4425   146.9060  -532.2053 
 Akaike AIC   2.548346  -8.130892  -2.045054   8.483803 
 Schwarz SC   2.880882  -7.798355  -1.712517   8.816340 
 Mean dependent  -11.29302  -0.007634   2.729329   90.66958 
 S.D. dependent   22.74915   0.049978   2.760866   155.0391 
         
           
LM Test for autocorrelation 
     
      Lags  LM-Stat  Prob 
     
      1   21.89358   0.1467 
2   26.24410   0.0507 
3   22.16579   0.1379 
4   16.51045   0.4179 
     
       
 
Table 2: Cointegration Tests 
         
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)   
         
          Hypothesized    Trace  0.05   
No. of CE(s)  Eigenvalue  Statistic  Critical Value  Prob.** 
         
          None *   0.217116   55.81448   47.85613   0.0075 
At most 1   0.127939   24.23897   29.79707   0.1905 
At most 2   0.043489   6.579412   15.49471   0.6270 
At most 3   0.006519   0.843711   3.841466   0.3583 
         
           Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
         
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
         
          Hypothesized    Max-Eigen  0.05   
No. of CE(s)  Eigenvalue  Statistic  Critical Value  Prob.** 
         
          None *   0.217116   31.57551   27.58434   0.0145 
At most 1   0.127939   17.65956   21.13162   0.1431 
At most 2   0.043489   5.735701   14.26460   0.6473 
At most 3   0.006519   0.843711   3.841466   0.3583 
         
           Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
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Table 3: The Long-run Equilibrium Relationship 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Greek spreads 
 
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          C  1227.195  209.2463  5.864832  0.0000 
Economic Activity  -49.58121  5.818096  -8.521897  0.0000 
Relative prices  4496.757  1112.390  4.042429  0.0001 
Fiscal news (cumulated)  -2.361796  0.858002  -2.752669  0.0068 
TIME  -8.212937  1.586209  -5.177715  0.0000 
Oil prices (-4)  0.666298  0.509717  1.307194  0.1936 
         
           
 